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I. INTRODUCTION

In the western corner of Texas, the growing city of El Paso and its
Mexican counterpart, Ciudad Juarez, are learning about the disappearance of
a vital resource the hard way.' These two cities share an ever increasing
dependence on the Hueco Bolson Aquifer for all their water needs.2 Rapid
population growth coupled with an annual rainfall of less than nine inches
create the potential for severe water issues.3 Although both cities realize an
impending crisis regarding their future water needs, no legal agreement or
policy has been made to address the situation.' It seems appropriate that in the
year following the United Nations' (UN) "International Year of Freshwater,"
countries sharing groundwater resources should come together and create
agreements to protect these precious and necessary resources.'
International water resources include "lakes, rivers[,] ...aquifers, and
any combination of these to which more than one state contributes or has
access."6 Water does not recognize international boundaries and flows freely
across borders from one country to another.7 Globalization of water and
environmental issues has forced states to realize that because political
boundaries are not recognized by water, the problems must be viewed in a
broad, inclusive way.' Narrow evaluation of the problem leads to increased
competition and no protection of the shared resource.9

I. See Octavio E. Chavez, Mining ofInternationallySharedAquifers:The El Paso-JuarezCase,
40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 237, 237-39 (2000).
2. Id. at 237-38.
3. Id.; Records for El Paso, ExtremesforEl Paso, Texas 1879-1994, at http://rgfn.epcc.edu/users/
nwselp/recelp.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003).
4. Chavez, supra note 1, at 237.
5. United Nations, InternationalYear ofFreshwater 2003, at http/Avww.wateryear2003.org (last
visited Sept. 6, 2003). For the purposes of this comment, the word sharing will signify "transboundary,"
recognizing that the legal meaning of "sharing" can vary.
6. Eya Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater:The Challenges
of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J.INT'L L. 384, 398 (1996). The International Law
Commission (ILC) does not currently include "unrelated confined groundwater," which is an aquifer that
underlies an international boundary but is not hydrologically connected to surface water, as an international
water source because of its isolated characteristics. Id.at 398,399 n.76. However, because shared resource
problems still exist when both states have use access, unrelated confined aquifers will be included in the
discussion with other types of aquifers for the purposes of this comment. See id. at 398.
7. Adrienne Paule, Underground Water. A Fugitive at the Border, 13 PACEENVrL. L. REV. 1129,
1130 (1996).
8. Stephen McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water
Problems, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 139-40 (199 1).
9. Id. at 139.
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Historically, many international agreements regarding resource allocation
were motivated by one state seeking to gain an advantage over another country
through control of a resource.' ° Water is inherently different from other
resources because of its life giving and sustaining potential; therefore, any
agreement created to address a shared groundwater resource must be created
in a cooperative manner." Water is not a legal issue; it is a life issue with
legal ramifications.'" Because of the different needs for water versus other
natural resources, different conflicts will arise for its attainment; therefore,
3
states must shift from passive to active policy decision-making.' Once this
shift in thinking occurs, water policy can be created using a community-based
approach to protect the survival of affected communities."
The problems that can arise from an international shared resource are
clearly seen on the United States-Mexico border.'" In addition to the Hueco
Bolson Aquifer in El Paso, the two countries share several aquifers, and6many
are encountering problems with availability and contamination.' The
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), an agency
responsible for enforcing water treaties on the Mexico-United States border,
recognized the need to develop a comprehensive groundwater agreement
7
between the two countries, but little has been accomplished.' Although
significant attention has been given to international surface water, little to no
8
policy has been generated regarding shared groundwater.
Groundwater is generally defined as subsurface water existing below the
water table.' 9 Although surface water and groundwater are distinct in many
10. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 393.
11. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 237-39.
12. See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 384.
13. See G. Emlen Hall, Historical and PhysicalInternationalBoundaries in Borderlands Water
Conflicts: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 865 (2000).
14. See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 392-93.
15. See Kate A. Berry, Water Along the Border: An Introduction to "Water Issues in the US.Mexico Borderlands,"40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 755 (2000).
16. See M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated
Environmental Planfor the Mexican-United StatesBorderArea, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 646-48 (1993);
Carlos Marin, Bi-NationalBorder Water Supply Issues From the Perspectiveof the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 35, 35 (2003).
17. See Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunitiesfor
ManagingTransboundaryGroundwateron the Mexico-US. Border,40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341, 341-42
(2000).
18. Dante A. Caponera & Dominique Alheritiere, PrinciplesforInternationalGroundwaterLaw,
18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 589, 591 (1978). Compare INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, MINUTE 308,
CYCLE
UNITED STATES ALLOCATION OF RIO GRANDE WATERS DURING THE LAST YEAR OF THE CURRENT
(2002) (showing an example of a surface water agreement between the United States and Mexico),
available at http://www.lbwc.state.gov/Files/linutes/Minute 308.pdf, and INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N, MINUTENO. 307, PARTIALCOVERAGE OF ALLOCATION OFTHE RIO GRANDETREATY TRIBUTARY

WATER DEFICIT FROM FORT QUITMAN TO FALCON DAM (2001) (showing an example of a surface water
agreement between the United States and Mexico), availableat http:l/www.lbwc.state.gov/files/minutes/
min307.pdf, with Paule, supranote 7, at 1136 (explaining the lack of comparable groundwater agreements).
19. R. ALLAN FREEZE & JOHN A. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 2 (1979); see also infra notes 64-65
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ways, they are often interrelated within the hydrologic cycle.20 The hydrologic
cycle is the continuous circulation of water on earth.2' Water falls to the
earth's surface as precipitation, such as rain or snow, creating surface water
which seeps into the ground to become groundwater.2 2 In most cases,
groundwater discharges in the form of surface water only to be evaporated
into the atmosphere to start the cycle again.23 Pumping of groundwater from
wells is the greatest artificial discharge which removes water, at least
temporarily, from the hydrologic cycle.24
Two aspects of shared groundwater require examination. 25 The first issue
is use and allocation.2 6 Groundwater is a resource of growing importance
because surface water resources are quickly being depleted.27 Several
difficulties exist in raising public awareness of potential problems when no
limitations are placed on groundwater usage.s First, because aquifers are
subterranean and not visible, it is often difficult to quantify water storage
amounts.29 Storage capacity of an aquifer is estimated through a series of
complex mathematical equations.30 Differing scientific methodologies mean
that one set of results often contradicts another study's results and creates
confusion for the public.3' An additional problem is that human nature dictates
that something out of sight is out of mind; therefore, it often requires a crisis
to realize the need for monitoring groundwater use.32
The second issue is protecting groundwater from contamination and
pollution.33 Because society is becoming more and more dependant on

and accompanying text (providing a definition for groundwater).
20.

THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GROUND WATER AND SURFACE

WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 1-2, (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1139, 1998).

21.

See DAVID KEITH TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 13, 15-16 (2d ed. 1980).

22.
23.
24.

Id.

25.
26.

See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater, 31

Id.
Id. at 16.

NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 169 (1991).

27.

Payal Sampat, Deep Trouble: The Hidden Threat of Groundwater Pollution, 154

WORLDWATCH PAPER 1, 10-12 (2000).

28. See, e.g., FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 58-62; Albert E. Utton, The Development of
International Groundwater Law, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 95, 98 (1982).
29. See FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 58-62.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Jerry Needham, The Water Crisis: Aquifer's Tap Could Turn Tighter-More
Pumping RestrictionsMay Spell Even Less Water for ParchedArea, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug.
11, 1996, available at 1996 WL 11493276. The U.S. Geologic Survey studies estimate the Edwards
Aquifer in Texas has the capacity of forty-five million acre-feet, while other estimates are up to four times
that figure. Id.
32. Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to the Use of
Transboundary Groundwaters, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 151, 152-53 (Albert E. Utton &
Ludwik A. Teclaff eds., 1987); Ludwick A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water
Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty Law, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629, 636 (1979).
33. See Barberis, supra note 26, at 169.
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groundwater as a drinking water source, pollution of an aquifer has
34
increasingly dire consequences. This issue is further complicated in an
international context." In cases of groundwater pollution extending past a
36
nation's boundaries, liability issues develop. Turning to the United StatesMexico border, although the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA)
includes some environmental provisions, "not one treaty contains specific
measures to prevent future groundwater pollution or provides measures for
' 37 Because, by definition, any
remediation of currently polluted aquifers.
international agreement will involve at least two separate national
governments, problems can also exist with enforcement of any policy
38
regarding either use or pollution issues.
What factors should be considered in the creation of new international
39
groundwater policy if no laws currently exist? Can law from other
40
disciplines be applied to groundwater? Although other sources of law can
create the basis for policy, water's unique physical characteristics and uses
4
require customized agreements. 1 For example, some have suggested creating
policy based on a model of other regulated international resources such as oil
43
and gas.42 This notion is complicated by geologic variations. Many
groundwater resources are renewable, distinguishing them from nonrenewable
resources such as petroleum.4 4 Also, because water is necessary for more than
economic benefits, it warrants different treatment in negotiations and
agreements.45
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate the immediate need for
regional agreements to allocate shared groundwater along the United StatesMexico border. The comment will also evaluate policy options and list factors
46
that should be considered in the creation of shared groundwater policy. Part
II describes the basic geology of groundwater and how it has been historically

34. See id.
35. See id. 169-70.
36. Paule, supra note 7, at 1130.
37. Id. at 1132; see Aaron Holland, The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation: The Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the Enforcement of the United
States Environmental Law, 28 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1219 (1997).
38. Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. Wolf, Patternsin InternationalWater Resource Treaties: The
157, 166-67
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 1997 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
(1997).
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
42. See EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE (2002).
43. See TODD,supra note 21, at 13, 16.

44. See id.
45.
46.

See United Nations, supra note 5.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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treated by international law. 4' Understanding the basics of groundwater
systems and the interrelated nature of surface water and groundwater is critical
in the formation of international agreements to predict how one action will
affect other users.48 This section also discusses past water agreements, which
can create a foundation for future agreements.49 It is also important to
understand how groundwater has been historically viewed to assess what
needs to be modified to affect change."0
Part III discusses the current groundwater situation along the United
States-Mexico border.5" The section describes shared water resources and
potential conflicts.52 It also reviews existing water law on both sides of the
border.5 3 Any future agreement will have to be created according to the
regional geology and coincide with existing regulations and regulatory
agencies. 4 Finally, Part IV provides a detailed look at policy options for
future international groundwater law including the factors that should be
considered in its creation." This section reviews aspects of past agreements
and policies that have been successful and should be included in any future
groundwater agreements.5 6
II. SURVEYING THE LAND: UNDERSTANDING EXISTING CONDITIONS

Before new policy can be created, an understanding must be had
regarding the local issues and historic precedent.5 The first important factor
in any groundwater agreement is understanding regional geology and the basic
characteristics of groundwater.5 8 Variations in the way two states can share
groundwater can lead to different policy treatments.5 9
Policy makers should also review past agreements to understand historic
treatment of groundwater.60 Although groundwater policy is a new, emerging
field, any past agreements will create the foundation for future laws. 6'

47.

See discussion infra Part II.

48.

See discussion infra Part II.

49.

See discussion infra Part II.B.

50.
51.
52.
53.

See
See
See
See

54.
55.

See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.

discussion infra Part 11.
discussion infra Part 111.
discussion infra Part Ill.
discussion infra Part III.D.

56. See discussion infra Part IV.
57. See infra text accompanyingnotes 63-271; Barberissupranote 26, at 169-85; Gabriel Eckstein
& Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and

International Law, 19 AM. U.INT'L L.REv. 201, 222-31 (2003).
58. See discussion infra Part I.A; Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 207-22.
59. See Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 232-43.
60. See generally Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 589-600 (enumerating past
groundwater agreements).
61. See, e.g., Bernard J. Wohlwend, An Overview ofGroundwater in InternationalLaw, A Case
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Knowledge of past laws and their origins will assist in cooperative efforts
towards future agreements.62
A. UnderstandingGroundwater
Although many people assume all water sources are the same, surface
63
water and groundwater are very distinct, though interrelated, resources.
Groundwater is often incorrectly considered an underground river.' It is
better defined as:
[Slubsurface water that occurs beneath the water table in soils and geologic
formations that are fully saturated .... It is part of the hydrologic cycle, and
an understanding of its role in this cycle is mandatory if integrated analyses
are to be promoted in the consideration of watershed6 resources, and in the
regional assessment of environmental contamination. 1
The hydrologic cycle is an endless circulation of water between ocean,
atmosphere, and land.66 Precipitation is dropped and carried as overland flow,
commonly called surface water, and then infiltrated into the soil to become
groundwater.67
68
Most groundwater is found in aquifers. An aquifer is defined as a
"saturated permeable geologic unit that can transmit significant quantities of
69
water under ordinary hydraulic gradients." The two major types of aquifers
are confined and unconfined.70 A confined aquifer is restrained between two
impermeable geologic layers physically separating it from the ground
surface.7 Its isolation from the surface, however, does not necessarily mean
a lack of interaction with surface water.72 In most cases, confined aquifers are
recharged by recharge zones located at higher elevations at the surface, and
73
the aquifer often discharges into rivers or lakes down gradient. A confined
aquifer is often under pressure; as a result, the water level can rise above the

Study: The Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer 1, 1 (2002), availableat http://www.bjwconsult.comrhe/o20
Genevese%/620Aquifer.pdf, (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
62. See discussion infra Part lI.B; Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 589-600.
63. See TODD, supra note 21, at 13, 16.
64. Barberis, supra note 26, at 168.
65. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 2-3.
66. Id. at4.
67. Id. at3.
68. Barberis, supra note 26, at 167.
69. FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 47.
70. Id. at 48.
71. Id.
72. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 212.
73. Id.
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top of the aquifer.74 This water level is not the top of the aquifer; it is only a
pressure surface created by the force of the overlying confining layer.7 '
The second type of aquifer is an unconfined aquifer. 6 In this type of
aquifer, the water table forms the upper boundary of the aquifer." This is an
important distinction from a confined aquifer because an unconfined aquifer
has no impediment between the top of the aquifer and the ground surface. 8
Therefore, interaction between groundwater and surface water is more likely.79
It is also possible for an aquifer to be a combination of confined and
unconfined.80
Unlike other natural resources, "the total volume of water in nature is
fixed and invariable."'" This "world water balance" consists only of roughly
2.5% fresh water.8 2 A large portion of this is in solid form including icecaps
and glaciers."' Of the remaining amount of fresh water not in solid form, twothirds is groundwater.8 4
The danger of groundwater depletion is tied to residence times, or the
amount of time water "lives" in a certain location.85 The turnover time of
water in a river is approximately two weeks.86 In contrast, the turnover time
for groundwater may be tens, hundreds, or possibly thousands of years. 7
Therefore, although groundwater is technically a renewable resource, its
renewability is severely limited by time and the world water balance. 8 A
technically renewable aquifer can recharge at such a rate that it is functionally
nonrenewable. 9

FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note

74.
75.

See id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

19, at 48.

79. Id.
80. TODD, supra note 21, at 42. The San Pedro Basin Aquifer is an example of a combination
aquifer. See Hector M. Arias, InternationalGroundwaters: The Upper San PedroRiver Basin Case, 40

NAT. RESOURCES J. 199, 204 (2000). This aquifer is shared by Mexico and the United States, and the
unconfined groundwater flows in relation to the San Pedro River. Id. at 199-200, 204. In contrast, it
becomes confined in the Palominas-Hereford and the St. David-Benson areas. Id. at 204. The groundwater
issue in this area is not water availability, but rather water accessibility. See id. at 210. Excessive pumping
inthe area creates a cone, a depression large enough to disable surrounding pumps to reach the water table.
Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Barberis, supra note 26, at 167.
Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 204 n.13.
Id.
Id.
See TODD, supra note 21, at 24-25.
FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 5.

87.
88.

Id.
See id.

89. See, e.g., Rex Buchanan, Study Measures Recharge inthe Ogallala Aquifer,KAN.GEOLOGiCAL
SERV. 7-8 (Dec. 19,2003), at http://www.kgs.ukans.eduGeneraiNews/2OO3/ogallala.html (last visited
Feb. 1,2004) (explaining that, although renewable, the Ogallala Aquifer recharges at a slower rate than it
is being used, significantly lowering the water level).
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The United States relies on groundwater for half of its drinking-water
needs. 9° This percentage is much higher for rural users who depend on
groundwater for almost 100% of their needs. 9' Texas's average groundwater
withdrawal in 1990 was almost eight billion gallons per day. 92 By 1995,
Texas depended on groundwater for forty-five percent of its drinking water.93
This number increases yearly for many reasons, including population
95
growth. 94 In 1960, Texas's state population was less than ten million people.
In the 2000 census, the population had grown to almost twenty-one million
people and is currently growing at an estimated rate of 400,000 people per
year.96
A natural resource is considered shared to the extent that the use of
waters of an international watercourse system in the territory of one state can
affect the use of waters of that system in the territory of another system state.97
An aquifer system includes both the recharge zone, natural discharge zones,
and the actual aquifer because the quantity of water in an aquifer can be
adversely affected by exploitation or by a modification of its sources of supply
or discharge.9" It is necessary to define the type of shared resource in order
to determine how it will be treated under international law." Two states can
share a groundwater resource in several scenarios."'0
The first category of shared groundwater is confined aquifers that cross
an international boundary.' Within confined aquifers two possibilities exist
-those that have a hydrologic relationship to the surface water and those
In both
isolated bodies of water without any surface water interactions.'

90. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 201-02.
91. See Purdue UniversityAmericanPopulation WaterSupply,at http://pasture.ecn.purdue.edu/agenhtmllagen521/epadirgrndwtrpopulation.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
92. United States Geologic Survey, Water Science Map Gallery, at http://wwwga.usgs.gov/edu/
maptotalgw.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
93. United States Geologic Survey, Ground Water Use in the UnitedStates, at http://wwwga.usgs.
gov/edu/wugw.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
94. See Utton, supra note 28, at 97.
95. Texas State Data Center & Office of State Demographer, Total Resident Population and
PercentPopulationChange in Texas: 1850 to 2000, at http://txsdc.tamu.edu (last visited Mar. 25,2004).
96. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual PopulationEstimates by State, at http://quickfacts.census.govl
qfd/states/48000.html (last modified Dec. 27, 2002).
97. See generally McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 154.
98. See FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 4; Barberis, supra note 26, at 169.
99. Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 388.
100. See Barberis, supra note 26, at 168-69.
101. See id. at 168; Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 244-48.
102. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 234. Past assessments of shared aquifer possibilities
did not make any distinctions and placed all confined aquifers in one general category. See Barberis, supra
note 26, at 168. This creates problems because of possible international law implications when the
boundaries and characteristics of a shared aquifer are not well defined. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note
57, at 234.
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models, international consequences occur if an aquifer lies completely within
one state, but its recharge zone lies in another state. 3
The second series of shared groundwater models are generated from an
unconfined aquifer that is hydrologically linked with a river, and one or both
water bodies traverse an international boundary."' The first situation is an
unconfined aquifer that traverses an international boundary linked
hydrologically to a river that forms the boundary between two states. 0 5 A
slightly different scenario is one in which the aquifer traverses the
international boundary, but the river crosses the international boundary instead
of creating it.' °6 In this case, both the aquifer and the river cross the state
boundary. 7
The third model in this group is an aquifer that traverses the international
This model
boundary and a river that is located entirely within one state.'
is important because, although much of the recharge for the aquifer generated
from the river is located in one state, the actual water source is shared by two
states; the reverse is also possible. 9 In the second series of models, it is
important to determine if the river is effluent or influent." ° An effluent river
is one in which the aquifer feeds the flow of the river, and an influent river is
one that recharges the aquifer."' The international implication of either
situation is that one state can deplete one resource by mining the other one. 2
The implications for each state will change dramatically depending on
the model that exists."' Understanding geology and how two states share a
groundwater resource will affect the policy options."" In addition to
understanding the local geologic situation, law makers must also understand
how groundwater has been historically treated."' Past agreements and custom
are strong indicators of future agreement terms.16

103. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 244-45.
104. Id. at 236-43.
105. Id. at 236-38.
106. Id. at 239-40. The San Pedro Basin Aquifer, which crosses the border between Mexico and
Arizona, is an example of this aquifer model. Arias, supra note 80, at 199-200.
107. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 239-40.
108. Id. at241-42. The Mimbres Basin Aquifer, which crosses the border between Mexico and New
Mexico, is an example of this scenario. Id. at 242.
109. See id.
110. Barberis, supra note 26, at 168.
111. See id. The Rio Grande River and the Hueco Bolson Aquifer along the United States-Mexico
border is an example ofthis type of model. John Walton & Gregory Ohlmacher, Surface and Ground Water
Interactions: El Paso-Juarez Region, I, 3 at http://rorykate.ce.utcp.edu/surfgw/SCERP0997/SCERP
MonographWWVersion.pdf. (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
112. See Barberis, supra note 26, at 168.
113. See Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 235-48.
114. See id.
115. See Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 589.
116. See id.

2004]

INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER POLICY

1221

B. Historic Treatment of Water by InternationalLaw
International law generally provides that states have the right to exploit
their own resources but have the responsibility to not do so with other states'
resources." 7 Although the UN has stressed the need to apply this theory to
shared water resources, it has never explicitly included groundwater." 8
Historically, treaties and agreements that gave mention to international
groundwater rarely made it the main focus; therefore, little consensus exists
regarding how to approach these issues." 9 Because of the lack of precedent,
future international groundwater law must draw from a combination of
sources, including past international law, existing agreements, and local
of groundwater.'2" These sources provide the basis for future
treatment
2'
policy.'
1. Sources of Law
Law is generated from various sources. 2 It is frequently created from
past laws, expert opinions, or human experience. 23 Sources found within the
state can provide guidance. 24 Communities create laws based on what they
know. 25 Understanding 26this subtle element is the first step to a workable
policy for a community.
a. History and Custom
International law often finds its origins in Roman Law.'2 Under Roman
Law, groundwater was either included in ownership or a commodity, which
could be purchased.' 28 The Roman theory of resource ownership attaching to
the land was adopted by French and Spanish Civil Code in the late 1800s.29
The law dictated that full use of springs located on the property was
acceptable as long as it did not negatively affect a neighbor. 30 English
117. G.A. Res. 2995, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., at 42 (1972), available at http://ods-dds.ny.un.org
/doc (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
118. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 613 (citing Report of the United Nations Water
Conference, Mar del Plata Conference, at 51, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.70/CBP/I (1977)).
119. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 222-31.
120. See Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 589.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554(1983) (looking to precedent to reach adecision).
126. See Hamner & Wolf, supra note 38, at 159.
127. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 598.
128. Id. at 599.
129. Id. at 598-99.
130. Id.
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Common Law also held that groundwater was part of the overlying land.' 3 '
This theory was adopted by the United States,' 32 but many states have since
modified this practice.' 3 3
Custom has always played a role in how a culture deals with water, and
laws often reflect current societal views.1 31 "Treaties can tell about regional
hegemony, about how and which water needs are met, about the relative
importance of water in the political climate, about development issues, and
whether earlier treaties have successfully guided or guaranteed state
behavior."' 3 This can be seen in the previously omnipresent United States
law and enduring Texas law of "right of capture.' 36 Texas's pervasive culture
of private ownership causes citizens to think property possession extends to
unlimited use of all associated resources, which creates a significant barrier
to groundwater law modification.3 3 Because law is often a reflection of
culture, custom should be considered in the creation of water agreements.' 38
The custom regarding shared resource situations has often resulted in one
state attempting to gain control of the groundwater source to obtain power
over another state.' 39 Because water has unique implications, states must
avoid trying to "increase the power gap" by controlling the resource and
cooperate with the sharing state. 40 A government must balance the needs of
its domestic groups as well as the other state's interest. 141
Multilateral water agreements generally fall into one of three
categories. 42 The "content of water" agreements include, among other things,
navigation, water supply, and quality. 4 1 In these agreements water is not the
131. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 222-23.
132. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 599.
133. See Paule, supra note 7, at 1139-42.
134. See Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiator Custom: the CheckeredDevelopment of InternationalWater
Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 63 (1991); Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North
America's Management of its Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 440-41 (1993)
(explaining that conflicts on the U.S.-Mexico border are often a reflection of"the way United States citizens
have been trained to think about Mexico and Mexicans" and differences between Mexican and United
States common law systems regarding land tenure).
135. Hamner & Wolf, supra note 38, at 159.
136. Eric Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An Outdated Principle Beyond its Time, 6 U.
DENy. WATER L. REv. 87, 88 (2002).
137. Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillem, Deep Trouble: Optionsfor Managingthe Hidden Threat
ofAquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEx. TECH L. REV. 249, 250-251 (2001). See also Sipriano v. Great
Spring Waters of Am., Inc., I S.W.3d 75, 76-77 (Tex. 1998) (stating that not upholding the rule of capture
would interfere with" 'drainage and agriculture, mining, the construction of highways and railroads, with
sanitary regulations, building, and the general progress of improvement in works of embellishment and
utility' "(quoting Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. 1904)).
138. See Teclaff, supra note 134, at 63.
139. See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 393.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. James L. Wescoat, Jr., Main Currents in Early Mutilateral Water Treaties: A HistoricalGeographic Perspective,1648-1948, 7 COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 43 (1996).
143. Id.
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purpose of the agreement, but the vehicle to achieve another goal.'4 4 The
"territorial context of water" agreements mainly focus on distribution of
property after a dispute and mention water in boundary agreements. 4 5
Finally, in "written context" agreements, water is the sole subject of the treaty,
a major topic, or minor clause.' 46
The majority of historic water treaties focused on navigation of surface
water.' 47 It has only been in recent years that water treaties were formed for
the purpose of water allocation, although very few of these dealt with
groundwater. 48 Other historic treaties focused49on other factors such as
defense, national boundaries, and flood control.
Recently, as the demand for water resources and the scarcity of water
have increased, more water treaties have been created to define allocation. 5 '
Four general trends have been recognized in water allocation treaties. 5 ' The
first is a shift from a rights-based to a need-based approach.' 5 2 Second, in
disputes between upstream and downstream riparian users, needs of the
downstream riparian are more often delineated.' Third, economic benefits
finally, the uniqueness of the
are not explicitly used in allocating water, and
54
basin becomes an explicit part of the treaty.
Learning local custom and historic groundwater law creates a background
for future policy, but it does not provide specific terms to include in an
agreement.' 55 To gain ideas of legal options, one must turn to something more
concrete.' 56 This is difficult because little existing policy has been created,
but analogies can be made to similar struggles occurring within a nation's
boundaries.' 5 7

144.

Id.

145.

Id. at 46.

146. Id. at 49.
147. Hamner& Wolf, supra note 38, at 158.
148. Id. at 162-64. Examples of past treaties that included groundwater include (1) the 1925
agreement between Egypt and Italy on the Ramba Well, (2) the 1927 Convention of Protocol between the
USSR and Turkey regarding the use of frontier waters, (3) the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allies and
Italy, and (4) the 1958 agreement concerning water economy between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Caponera
& Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 593.
149. Wescoat, supranote 142, at 51-52.
150. See Caponera & Aheritiere, supranote 18, at 591-94.
151. Hamner & Wolf,supra note 38, at 162-63.
152. Id. at 162.
153. Id. at 162-63.
154. Id. at 163.
155. See id. at 159.
156. See Utton, supra note 28, at 104-05.
157. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517
(1936); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (providing examples of interstate water conflicts
within the United States).
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b. InterstateLaw
International water policy often finds its source in interstate law.'
Although technically not international law, the interstate laws of some
influential countries, such as Canada and the United States, have provided the
basis for international agreements. 59 Some interstate conflicts can also create
conflict between
international conflicts. 6 For example, a water allocation
6
New Mexico and Texas may also impact Mexico.' '
The three mechanisms which states use to create interstate cooperative
agreements are "1) the interstate agreement or compact, which creates rules
for regulating the relationship between the parties; 2)judicial decision, which
ascertains the existing better rights as between the parties; and 3) paramount
federal power."' 6 2
National systems vary in the amount of power given to the government
to control water use.'6 3 Some systems give their government great latitude to
solve water disputes while others favor a more decentralized approach."6 The
United States has more interstate compacts than any other country, although
few deal with groundwater. 65 The goal of the majority of water allocation
agreements is equal distribution of the resource. 66 In some parts of the United
States, associations, at a local level, have been formed to evaluate the
exchange of information regarding water needs and management issues of the
167
neighboring states.
In situations where interstate cooperation failed, the courts have stepped
in to solve shared resource problems. 6 Decisions of interstate conflicts have
focused on fair division of the water and good faith use to ensure that one

158. Utton, supranote28, at 104.
159. Id. at 104-05.
160. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 241.
161. See id.
162. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 604.
163. See id. at 604-06.
164. See id. at 604-05. The Swiss government is an example of a broad allocation of power allowing
for government intervention and control where necessary. ld.at 604. This is in contrast to Germany and
Canada which favor a more decentralized approach, leaving water agreements in the hands of the localities

affected. Id. at 604-05.
165. Id. at 606. Anexampleofinterstate groundwater agreements include the Delaware River Basin
Compact, which must balance the needs ofNew York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Id. at 60607. The compact controls both groundwater and surface water withdrawals in addition to monitoring
pollution control. Id. at 607. Other interstate agreements with groundwater references include the Lower
Niobrara River and Ponca Creek Compact between Nebraska and South Dakota and the Upper Niobrara
River Basin Compact between Nebraska and Wyoming. Id. at 606-07.
166. Id. at 606.
167. Id. at608. In 1975, Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska formed a Groundwater
Management Districts Association to create a vehicle for the exchange of information. Id.
168. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
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person's use does not harm another's use.' 69 In the early case of Nebraska v.
Wyoming, Nebraska brought suit against Wyoming alleging that Wyoming and
Colorado were diverting an excessive amount of the North Platte River and
depriving Nebraska of its water. 7 ' One issue in this case, which is applicable
to international situations, is that the states had different state law dealing with
7
surface water rights, forcing the Court to decide which law to apply.' ' When
states follow the same law, the law can be applied by the courts, but in
7
situations like the one in Nebraska,a compromise must be reached. "
73
Until recently, almost all interstate water cases involved surface water.
74 In
One early case brought shared groundwater to. the Court's attention.'
Washington, the Court held that "the right to pump in reasonable quantities for
75
the beneficial enjoyment ofthe overlying land is allowed."' The Court based
its decision on local geology to determine how the subterranean water flowed
without the effects of pumping, stating that their decision might be different
with varying groundwater characteristics. 7 6
More recent interstate groundwater cases have centered on one state or
private party purchasing water for export outside the selling state's
boundaries.' 77 The Court in Sporhase held that groundwater is an article of
commerce and is subject to congressional regulations.' 78 The Court used the
example of the Ogallala aquifer, which is shared by several states, and the
79
scarcity of water in certain areas to demonstrate the federal interest in water.
As an article of commerce, a state cannot deny exportation of water to another
state unless it can put forth a statute that "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, . . . its effects on interstate commerce are
80
only incidental," and the burden to commerce is not excessive.
Nebraska's stated purpose was "to conserve and preserve diminishing
sources of ground water."'' The Court found this purpose legitimate but not
sufficient to pass constitutional muster because of the excessive burden the
statute imposed. 8 In dicta, Justice Stevens stated the Court's hesitancy to

169. See Washington, 297 U.S. at 520, 527; Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 617.
170. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 591-92.
171. Id. at 599-600.
172. Compare Wyomingv. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,424(1922) (providing an example ofcompeting
states that have the same state law regarding water), with Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 599-600 (providing an
example of competing states with different legal frameworks).
173. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (demonstrating the increase
in interstate groundwater cases); City of El Paso v. S.E. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
174. See Washington, 297 U.S. at 517.
175. Id. at 525.
176. Id.
177. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944-45; City of El Paso, 563 F. Supp. at 381.
178. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-54.
179. Id. at 953.
180. Id. at 954 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 954-58.
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hinder a state's effort to conserve a vital resource and made the distinction
between economic protectionism and health and safety issues. 3 Similar
issues might be seen in the future in an international context.' 84 Although the
Commerce Clause is only enforceable within the United States, the reasoning
expressed in Sporhase could be applied to internationally shared
groundwater." 5
Another source of interstate agreements is legislation generated from the
European Economic Community (EEC)." 6 The EEC has enacted shared
natural resources legislation to protect and conserve the environment
including groundwater. 87 Directives focus on an open exchange of
information and assessment triggered by the impact on one state's resources
based on the actions of another state."' Enforcement is achieved through a
committee comprised of members jointly appointed by all affected states."8 9
Evaluating how courts have dealt with groundwater issues generates
another brick in the foundation of future policy, but many courts have not yet
had to deal with these issues."S Other multidisciplinary groups, comprised of
scientists and legal scholars, have been assessing future problems and
recommending factors for future working agreements. 9 ' Although these
groups may not be creating enforceable policy, the fruits of their cooperative
efforts are still important. 92
c. Nongovernmental andIntergovernmentalAgencies
Although most water law has been created through treaties and
agreements in response to a shared water resource, the role of
nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies should not be
underestimated in the evolution of international water law. 193 Two
organizations, in particular, should be noted."9 The first of these is the
International Law Commission (ILC), a group of elected members assembled

183. Id. at 956.
184. See generally id. at 954-58 (discussing economic protectionism and health and safety issues).
185. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3; Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-58.
186. See Stefano Burchi, Shared Natural Resources in the European Economic Community
Legislation, in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 77 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik A. Teclaffeds., 1987).
187. Id. at 78.
188. Id. at 79.
189. Id. at 82.
190. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
191. See Robert D. Hayton, The Law ofInternational Aquifers, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 73, 80
(1982).
192. See id.
193. See Caponera & Aheritiere, supra note 18, at 589, 590-91.
194. See id. at 589-94; Shashank Upadhye, The International Watercourse: An Exploitable
Resource for the Developing Nation Under International Law?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 61, 74
(2000).
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by the UN in 1947.'9' In 1970, the UN directed the ILC to examine nonnavigational uses of watercourses with the objective of codifying a
9
progressive level of international law." Although the ILC has helped create
97
guidelines for water law, originally its limited scope excluded groundwater.
This has recently been modified to a broader definition of a water basin that
98
explicitly includes certain types of groundwater. The second agency worth
noting is the group of scholars in the International Law Association (ILA), a
"major international nongovernmental organization devoted to international
legal matters.'"
The ILA is responsible for some of the earliest efforts to address shared
groundwater issues."' This has been accomplished through a series of
conferences generating guidance rules, which are promulgated as a fall-back
20
for states that did not have their own rules. ' The first of these are the
Helsinki Rules, created in 1966.02
The Helsinki Rules are significant to the evolution of international water
policy for several reasons and form the basis of many international water
agreements." 3 The first important feature of the Rules was their emphasis on
the "unity of the drainage basin" when creating an agreement." This is
valuable because Article II specifically includes groundwater by defining an
international drainage basin as a "geographical area extending over two or
more States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters,
including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common
terminus." '° Although it is unlikely that the rule makers were focused on
2
Article II's applicability to groundwater, " its inclusion is now viewed as a
20 7
landmark for the development of international groundwater law theory.
Another important aspect of the Rules is that they were formed under a
theory of "equitable utilization," stating that each state was entitled to a

195.
196.
197.

McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 150.
Hayton, supra note 191, at 80.
Caponera & Alheritiere, supranote 18, at 589, 591.

198.

United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International

art. 2, U.N.Doc. A/RES/51/229 (1997)
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., at 29
available at http://www.un.orglga/documentslgares5l/gaSl-2 .htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter Watercourse Convention].
199. Hayton, supra note 191, at 73.
200. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 228.
201. Hayton, supra note 191, at 73 n.2.
202. Int'l Law Ass'n, The HelsinkiRules on the Uses ofthe Waters of InternationalRivers (1967),
available athttp:/www.intemationalwaterlaw.org/ntDocs/HelsinkiRuIes.htl (last visited Sept. 19,2003)
[hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
203. Itzchak E. Kornfeld, A Water Solutionfor the Middle East Conflict, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10207

(2003).
204.
205.
206.

207.

See Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 619.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. I1.
Hayton, supra note 191, at 74.

See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 141-44.
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"reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters."2 ' The
ILA did not define a reasonable and equitable share and instead recommended
decisions be made on a case-by-case basis "in the light of all the relevant
factors."' 9 In practice, equitable utilization means that a user can utilize a
resource so long as it does not harm another user who is sharing the
resource."' Intrinsic in this is the need for flexibility and cooperation of
21
users. 1

After the formation of the Helsinki Rules, the ILA created a Committee
on International Water Resources Law.212 This group has continued to
develop concepts of international groundwater law by creating guidance
rules. 2 3 The Seoul Conference of 1986 confirmed the ideas of the Helsinki
Rules and expanded them further to include all types of aquifers.2 4 The ILC
was reconvened in 1991 and has been striving to update the Helsinki and
Seoul Rules.215

208. Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. IV.
209. Id. at art. V. Although the Rules did not define equitable share, it did provide a
noncomprehensive list of factors that should be considered to assist in its determination. Id. These include
the following:
1. The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area
in the territory of each basin State;
2. The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each
basin State;
3. The climate affecting the basin;
4. The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
5. The economic and social needs of each basin State;
6. The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
7. The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin State;
8. The availability of other resources;
9. The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
10. The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means
of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
II. The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
Id. at art. V(I).
210. Kornfeld, supra note 203, at 10207.
211. Id.
212. Hayton, supranote 191, at 78.
213. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 141-50.
214. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 228-29. This inclusion of all types of aquifers is
accomplished by no longer requiring a connection between the surface and groundwater as required under
the Helsinki Rules. Compare Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. 11(describing the ILA's previous
stance excluding hydraulically unrelated aquifers), with Int'l Law Ass'n, The Seoul Rules on the Uses of
the Waters ofInternationalRivers, art. I& 11 (1986) (deciding to include hydraulically unrelated aquifers),
available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntDocs/SeouIRules.htm (list visited Mar. 26,2003).
This allows an aquifer that crosses an international boundary, which exists totally independent of surface
water to qualify as an international aquifer. Id.
215. Int'l Law Ass'n, New Delhi Conference (2002): Water Resources Committee, available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/htmllayout.committee.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
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The broad definition of an international drainage basin as outlined by the
16
Helsinki Rules has been a source of much debate." The ILC, for example,
originally refused to extend the definition to include the overlying territory in
17
an attempt to limit what would be governed by international law." In 1980,
the ILC's draft articles contained a note that stated: "A watercourse system
is formed of hydrographic components such as rivers, lakes, canals, glaciers
and groundwater ....""' Although this was an important step, the draft
9
articles themselves made no mention of groundwater." The ILC finally
agreed with the ILA's inclusion of groundwater in the definition of
watercourse at its 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, but the ILC's scope remains more narrow than the
that of the ILA.2" °
Several other important recommendations were made by the Watercourse
Convention.22 Similar to the Helsinki Rules, the Convention emphasized the
need for equitable use in an attempt to attain "optimal and sustainable
utilization." ' Cooperation was also emphasized by this and the earlier Mar
del Plata Conference in 1977.23 At Mar del Plata, the ILC recommended that
" 'countries sharing water resources... should review existing and available
techniques for managing shared water resources and cooperate in the
establishment of programs, machinery and institutions necessary for the

216. Hayton, supranote 191, at 80-81.
217. Dante A. Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principlesand
Institutions,in TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 1, 4 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik A. Teclaffeds., 1987).
218. Hayton, supranote 191, at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Report of the InternationalLaw
Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, 35 U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 247,
U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980) [hereinafter Thirty-Second Session]).
219. Id.
220. Watercourse Convention, supra note 198. Although the definition of an international
watercourse was expanded, it still does not include confined transboundary aquifers, which are aquifers that
are not related to any surface water body. Stephen McCaffrey, The Contributionof the UN Convention on
the Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses, I INT'L J. GLOBAL ENVrL. ISSUES
250,251 (200 1), availableat http://www.intenationalwaterlaw.org (last modified Nov. 2,2003). An ILC
resolution encourages states to apply the principles enumerated in the draft articles to isolated aquifers. Id.
221. See Watercourse Convention, supranote 198.
222. Id. at art. V. In defining reasonable and equitable use, the convention created their own list of
factors that should be considered. Id. These factors are as follows:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural
character; (b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; c) The
population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; (d) The effects of the use
or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; (e) Existing
and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) Conservation, protection, development and economy
of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, ofcomparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.
Id. at art VI.
223. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 614 (citing Report of the United Nations Water
Conference,Mar del Plata Conference, at 53, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.70/CBP/I (1977)).
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coordinated development of such resources.' ,,224The theory of "no
substantial harm" was also included.225
Another UN organization worth noting is the Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE). The UNECE has "adopted a number of declarations,
'
decisions, and recommendations concerning fresh water."226
Many of these
227
include groundwater. Much of the UNECE's work focuses on groundwater
pollution, including the Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control of
Water Pollution, Including Transboundary Pollution.2 28 Some of the
UNECE's water usage efforts include the 1984 Declaration of Policy on the
Rational Use of Water, which echoes many of the sentiments of the Helsinki
Rules and other international recommendations. 22 9 This declaration
recognized the interconnected nature of surface water and groundwater and
encouraged "a unified strategy" for dealing with water issues and "coordinated utilization. '' 21' A later recommendation stated that any coordinated
water-use efforts by riparians must include a joint plan for the entire basin,
once again emphasizing the need for the integrated treatment of surface and
groundwater.2 3'
In 1992, the UNECE created the Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.232 This convention,
ratified by European countries and the Russian Federation,233 encourages
monitoring, research, cooperative interactions, including exchange of
information and mutual assistance, institutional arrangements, and public
access to information.234 With the ultimate goal of sustainable development,
participating countries "manage current environmental resources in a manner
that satisfies current demand without compromising the needs of future
generations."23' 5

224. Id. (alteration in original).
225. Watercourse Convention, supra note 198 ("Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an
international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse States.").
226. McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 161-62.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 162.
229. Id.

230.

id.

231. Id.at 162-63.
232. United Nations Economic Comm. for Europe, Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, at http://www.unece.org/env/water/welcome.htinl
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
233. United Nations Economic Comm. for Europe, Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes: Status of Ratification of Water Convention, at
http://www.unece.org/env/water/statuslegawc.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
234. United Nations Economic Comm. for Europe, supra note 233.
235. Chris Hudson, The Role ofInternationalEnvironmental Law in the Protection of the Danube
River Basin: The Bata Mare Cyanide Spill, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 367, 385 (2001).
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Although the rules and guidance generated from nongovernmental
agencies are important steps in the recognition of groundwater resources, a
23 6 Because the ILA is a
question is raised regarding their binding nature.
any rules
nongovernmental organization that requires no public participation,
237 The ILC's
created by it are not considered binding international law.
23
guidance is slightly more binding because it is made up of member states.
The 1997 Articles will become binding on those states who choose to sign and
23 9
It is possible that
ratify the Convention, but no state is required to sign.
even states that do not sign the Convention will be bound "if it represents
24 Regardless of whether the ILA or the ILC
customary international law."
rules are binding, the seemingly universal ideas of scholars that have
continued to appear, including equitable resource use, cooperation, and the
broad definition of a water drainage system, should be included in any future
24
international groundwater policy. '
2. Examples of Existing Groundwater Agreements and Treaties
is
Once the possible issues that should be considered are understood, it242
useful to examine how they have been applied by past water treaties.
Although international groundwater agreements are rare, a few agreements
and proposals serve as a helpful basis for understanding important factors for
a successful policy.243 Existing or model agreements244place ideas into a
In addition, their
workable structure that can be used by other countries. 245
evolution.
policy
for
weaknesses can be avoided, allowing
a. Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer Agreement
One of the most successful examples of shared groundwater policy is the
agreement between France and Switzerland regarding the Lake Geneva Basin
groundwater.24 6 This 1978 agreement was formed in response to a water

Uses
236. See Jordan C. Kahn, 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational
of InternationalWatercourses, 1996-1998 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y Y.B. 178 (1997).
237. Melvin Woodhouse, Is Public Participation a Rule ofthe Law oflnternational Watercourses?,
43 NAT. RESOURCES J.137, 175 (2003).
238. Kahn, supra note 236, at 178.
239. Id. at 183.
240. Id.
241. See Upadhye, supra note 194, at 69-83.
242. See, e.g., Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, TransboundaryGroundwaters: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989); Wohlwend, supra note 61.
243. See Hayton & Utton, supra note 242; Wohlwend, supra note 61.
244. Hayton & Utton, supra note 242; Wohlwend, supra note 61.
245. See, e.g., Hayton & Utton, supra note 242; Wohlwend, supra note 6 1.
246. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 227.
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shortage caused by the over-pumping of the nineteen kilometer aquifer.247 The
countries were forced to consider solutions when extraction exceeded natural
recharge.2 48 Proposed alternatives included reducing withdrawals by
supplementing the groundwater supply from other sources and enhancing
natural recharge. 249 A preliminary test of the latter failed, leading to
negotiations between the State of Geneva and the French Department of
Haute-Savoie.25 ° The result was one of the oldest and most successful
groundwater treaties.25'
One important aspect of this agreement is that it was formed as a
"regional arrangement between the competent local authorities. 2 2 Another
important feature is the creation of a six-member commission composed of
three members appointed by each participating country. 2 3 At least two of the
three appointees must be water specialists. 25 4 The purely consultative
commission meets twice yearly, alternating meeting locations between
Switzerland and France.2 55 The commission has the manifold task of
providing technical expertise, creating an annual plan for aquifer use, and
proposing groundwater protection measures. 256 All decisions are recorded and
presented to the reining authority at each respective country. 2 " Water
extraction and recharge are also monitored and metered by the local
authorities. 25 Future annual water needs are determined by users submitting
their pumping requirements to their commissions, who are then given
extraction permits. 9 Operation and maintenance costs are shared by the two
countries." This accord provides guidance for future treaties by presenting
an example of a workable agreement.26'
b. Bellagio Draft Treaty
The Bellagio Draft Treaty is a model agreement inspired by the water
situation along the Mexico-United States border and can be used by countries
seeking to create international water policy. 262 "The overriding goal of the
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Wohlwend, supra note 61, at 2.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
See id.
Id.at 1.
Id. at 6, 14.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6, 15.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 1.
Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for Solving Border Groundwater
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draft treaty is to achieve joint, optimum utilization of the available waters,
facilitated by procedures for avoidance or resolution of differences over
shared groundwaters in the face of the ever increasing pressures on this
priceless resource."2 63
The Bellagio Draft Treaty contains twenty articles with guidance for a
2M Similar to the
cooperative agreement of a shared groundwater resource.
concepts laid forth by the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses and the Helsinki Rules, the Bellagio Draft Treaty
is based on the theory of reasonable and equitable use to achieve optimum
utilization 26 5 To achieve this, the treaty contains guidance for water quality
protection, preparation ofmanagement plans, a drought management plan, and
dispute resolution.2 66
Perhaps most helpful to the management of such an agreement, the draft
267
treaty details requirements for a commission to monitor the aquifer. Similar
to the existing Franco-Swiss agreement, the commission would create and
maintain a detailed database with hydrologic parameters, aquifer level, and
water quality.26 s In addition to aquifer management, tasks of the commission
include budget preparation, declaring transboundary groundwater
2 69 The draft
conservation areas, drought alerts, and plan implementation.
treaty, adopted at the Sixth Congress of the International Water Resources
Association in Ottawa in 1988, creates useful guidelines for some important
factors in the formation of international agreements.
III. EXAMINING THE WATER SITUATION ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
Although water conflicts exist all over the world, the threat of a water
crisis is particularly high along the U.S.-Mexico border because of the arid
climate and increasing population.2 ' Population estimates of border counties
272 Predictions of population growth
are as high as twelve million residents.
estimate that this will double by 2020.3

Issues, II U.S.-MEx. L.J.57, 57 (2003). The Draft Treaty was the result of several years of collaboration
between Albert E. Utton and the Mexican ambassador, Cesar Sepulveda. Id.
263. Hayton & Utton, supra note 242, at 665.
264. Id. at 677-721.
265. See id. at 665.
266. Id. at 677-721.
267. Id. at 684-88.
268. Id. at 688-91.
269. Id. at 684-87.
270. Wohlwend, supra note 61, at 5.
271.

Irasema Coronado, Water Conflict in the Borderlands,7 BORDERLINES 57, I 1-2 (July 1999),

athttp:/www.americaspolicy.orgborderlinesll999bl57.bl57oviw-body.htm. (lastvisited Mar. 29, 2004).

272. Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and
InstitutionalChange: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 973, 973-74 (2000).
273. Id. at 974.
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The United States and Mexico share at least eighteen groundwater
sources. 74 Potential water disputes between the United States and Mexico
began with the secession of the southwest in 1848, because any boundary
agreement separating the land also separates the water.275 Of these, none are
governed by an official binational agreement.2 76 Many of these aquifers have
the added complication of being shared by more than one state, as well as by
both nations. 7 Water concerns have become particularly confusing as water
needs along the border increase."27 Better technology enhances understanding
and increases a city's ability to create effective change based on increased
understanding. 7 9
In addition to technical difficulties, several other barriers to negotiations
between the United States and Mexico are evident.2"' These barriers include
an excess of governmental agencies, cultural differences, language barriers,
and "dramatically different forms of government and notions of politics." ' '
These differences aside, the shared use of rivers, aquifers, and watersheds, as
well as increased trade and the practical dissolution of the border between the
two countries, compel communication and understanding for any water
agreements.2" 2
A. El Paso and CiudadJuarez: A Case Study
The scarcity of available water along the border can be seen in many
locations, but perhaps the best example is El Paso and Ciudad Juarez."8 3 The
combination of the arid climate and rapidly increasing population creates
serious future water concerns.2 Together, the two cities accommodate two
million residents, a number which increased sixty-three percent in Ciudad
Juarez and thirty-four percent in El Paso between 1980 and 1994 and
continues to grow.285 Population growth upstream creates an additional
demand on surface water and decreases the quantity available for El Paso. 28

274.
275.
276.

See Mumme, supra note 17, at 344, 363-77.
Hall, supra note 13, at 866.
Mumme, supra note 17, at 363-77.

277.

Id.

278. Hall, supra note 13, at 866.
279. See id. at 868.
280. See Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272, at 978-79.
281. Id. at 978.
282. Elaine Moore Hebard, A Focus on a Binational Watershed with a View Toward Fostering A
Cross-BorderDialogue,40 NAT. RESOURCES J.281, 283-84 (2000); Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272,
at 978-80.
283. See Hall, supranote 13, at 867. Other examples of cities with shared water are Laredo/Nuevo
Laredo, San Diego/Tijuana, and Ambos Mexico. Id.
284. Chavez, supra note 1, at 237-38.
285. Id.
286. Walton & Ohimacher, supra note 11, at 7.
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The United States Department of Agriculture estimates that the drought
in the Rio Grande basin started in 1993.287 " '[D]rought' means a moisture
deficit bad enough to have social, environmental or economic effects. 28 ' The
drought in the lower Rio Grande Valley is currently categorized as extreme. 8 9
Evaluating water issues faced by these two cities and their solutions provide
important information for future groundwater issues faced in other locations
along the border. 2 °
El Paso and Juarez share the Rio Grande River, the Hueco Bolson
aquifer, and the Mesilla Bolson aquifer for their water needs.2 ' In the past,
the Rio Grande River and shallow wells have been the primary source of
water.29 2 As local population has grown, so has the dependence on
groundwater. 293 Although the two cities account for eighty percent of the
groundwater usage, local farms and military installations also mine the
resource. 2" In general, the United States is able to fulfill all its water needs
while the majority of citizens of the Mexican colonias often do not meet their
295
daily needs.
The primary source of groundwater is the Hueco Bolson aquifer, which
is being depleted by both El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.29 Increased dependence
on groundwater by both sides of the border creates the potential for conflict
because the only legal framework for water allocation involves surface
water. 297 No existing agreement for groundwater is in effect.298
Several measures have been put into place on both sides of the border to
prolong a water crisis. 299 One way El Paso is attempting to create
sustainability is to reduce usage and reroute irrigation water and use it for
municipal purposes. "° El Paso has also increased its dependence on surface
water by piping water from Elephant Butte Dam."' In September 2002, El

287. O'Leary, supra note 262, at 59.
288. David Miskus, US. DroughtMonitor,at http://www.drought.unl.edu/dm/archive99/classify
.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
289. Id.
290. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 237.
291. Id. at 239. The Hueco Bolson is a transboundary aquifer shared by the United States and
Mexico. Id. The Mesilla Bolson is a renewable aquifer available to El Paso and New Mexico. Id.
292. Id. at 238.
293. Id. at 242.
294. Id.
295. Coronado, supra note 271, 13.
296. Chavez, supranote 1, at 242. Ciudad Juarez uses the aquifer for 100% ofits water needs. Id.
at 239.
297. Id. at241.
298. Id.
299. See O'Leary, supra note 262, at 57; Chavez, supra note 1, at 241.
300. Chavez, supra note 1, at 248; Rene Romo, Border'sFuture Caught Between Growth, Water
Supply, ABQ JOURNAL 11 (Sept. 19, 1999), at http:/www.adqjournal.com2000/nm/why/6whyO9-1999.htm.
301. Chavez, supra note I, at 239, 245.
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Paso improved its ability to treat Rio Grande water by expanding a water
treatment facility, increasing treatment capacity from forty to sixty million
gallons per day.30 2
Increased usage of surface water, particularly the Rio Grande, creates
only a temporary fix and can generate greater long-term problems. 3 3 The Rio
Grande is a losing stream, meaning that the groundwater is recharged in part
by stream flow.3" 4 A greater reliance on surface water can decrease the water
available in the aquifer.30 5 Excessive pumping can increase its salinity,
making the water less potable.30 6
On the other side of the border, Juarez plans to use some of its annual
Rio Bravo allocation of 60,000 acre-feet for municipal purposes to alleviate
the burden on the Rio Grande.3"' One of Juarez's biggest challenges is the
infrastructure of the utility system.0 Many of the systems are broken down
water
and little policy support is found.30 9 Up to thirty percent of Juarez's
3°
usage is lost through broken pipes and never reaches its inhabitants. '
Although no law governing the groundwater shared by these two cities
31
created, efforts are being made to work together for sustainability. 1
been
has
Joint projects have been useful in understanding each city's dependence on
312 City governments'
water sources and the development of usage plans.
13
IBWC.
the
by
planning efforts have been assisted
B. InternationalBoundary and Water Commission
The IBWC is the governing agency relied upon by both Mexico and the
United States to monitor international boundary water and settle disputes of
its use along the 2,000 mile United States-Mexico border. 3 4 Although'this
agency has been functioning for over one hundred years, it received little
attention until recently when water issues became a growing concern.31 5

302. O'Leary, supra note 262, at 57-58.
303. See Walton & OhImacher, supra note 111, at 3.
304. Id.; see note I I I and accompanying text.
305. See Walton & Ohimacher, supra note I 11, at 3.
306. Id.
307. O'Leary, supra note 262, at 58.
308. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 246.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 248-50.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 250.
314. Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource
Management: The United States Section of the InternationalBoundaryand Water Commission, United
States and Mexico, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 661 (1990). The IBWC consists of a Mexican and
American section. Marin, supra note 16, at 35.
315. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 413.
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The IBWC has a broad range of dispute resolution responsibilities
including "domestic, municipal, agricultural, and industrial water supplies; ...
fish and wildlife and recreation; ... floods and drought; ... pollution; and...
land use and environmental relationships."3"6 Although in the past the
Commission only oversaw surface water use, it has the potential to monitor
groundwater issues for shared aquifers.317
Treaty enforcement is also a responsibility of the IBWC.3"' The United
States has frequently violated treaty provisions regarding dispute resolutions
creating a viewed attitude of moral superiority.319 Mexico has also had
problems meeting its water obligations as defined by the 1944 treaty.320
On a regional level, the formation of consejos de cuencas is another
" ' These regional watershed councils have
method of water resource planning.32
been used by government agencies in border locations to create a local
approach to a problem.322 The 1944 Water Treaty gave the IBWC the lead
role and "a virtual monopoly on agreements dealing with transboundary water
management."3'23 Therefore, these groups would create a plan and then work
with the agency for its implementation.3 24 Although the 1BWC has not yet
created a groundwater agreement, recent working groups and policy
discussions indicate that the future of the IBWC will include groundwater.325
C. Existing Water Agreements Along the US.-Mexico Border
Although no formal groundwater accords between the United States and
Mexico have been created, several important agreements pertaining to surface
water and environmental concerns are in place.326 These should be understood

316. Id. at 414.
317. Chavez, supra note 1, at 241-42.
318. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 44 1.
319. Id.
320. Jill Warren, Mexico 's Compliance with the 1994 Water Treaty Between the UnitedStatesand
Mexico: A Texas Perspective, I I U.S.-MEX. L.J. 41, 42 (2003).
321. Christopher P. Brown & Stephen Mumme, Applied and TheoreticalAspects of Binational
Watershed Councils(Consejos de Cuencas) in the US.-Mexico Borderlands,40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 895,
904-05 (2000).

322.

Id.

323. Stephen P. Mumme, Reinventing the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission,
BORDERLINE 79 4 (July 2001), availableat http://www.americaspolicy.org/borderlines. On February
3, 1944, the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande. Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain
Future into InstitutionalResponsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the UnitedStates, 33
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 397,397(1993). This agreement defines the equitable distribution of the Rio Grande
River from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico and broadened the powers of the IWBC. Id.;
Warren, supra note 320, at 41.
324. See Brown & Mumme, supra note 321, at 910-11.
325. Mumme, supra note 323, 119-20.
326. See Szekely, supra note 323, at 397. The first bilateral water agreement was formed through
a convention in 1889. Id. In 1906, the Convention created an agreement to provide equitable distribution
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32 7 Surface water
because of the effect they may have on groundwater.
agreements can also form a basis on which future groundwater agreements can
be created.32 8
3 29
Two types of agreements can be created: formal and informal. Formal
agreements consist of treaties or memorandas of agreement between two
nations. 330 These often create agencies such as the IBWC to assist in
enforcement and conflict resolution.33 ' Informal accords involve meetings of
332 Both types are important
regional officials and nonbinding agreements.
333
elements of a cooperative effort to share a resource equitably.

1. Minute 242
The closest approximation to an existing groundwater agreement along
the U.S.-Mexico border is Minute 242. Minute 242 was signed in 1973 in
an effort to recognize the need for a groundwater agreement between the
United States and Mexico.335 Clause six requires the United States and
Mexico to consult with each other "prior to undertaking any new development
of either the surface or the groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial
modifications of present developments, in its own territory in the border area
that might adversely affect the other country. '336 The agreement also limits
37
groundwater pumping until a comprehensive agreement is created. Minute
242 was an important step in the creation of further regulation, but little
advancement has been made since its inception.338
2. La Paz Agreement
The 1983 Border Environment Cooperation, or "La Paz" Agreement, is
339
an important example of a bilateral agreement creating an ongoing dialogue.

of Rio Grande water for irrigation. Id.
327. See Mumme, supra note 17, at 346.
328. See id.
329. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272, at 976.

330. Id.
331. See id.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 976-80.
334. See Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, Minute 242: Permanent and Definite Solution to the
InternationalProblemof the Salinity of the ColoradoRiver (Aug. 30,1973), availableat http://www.usbr.
gov/Ic/region/pao/pdfiles/min242.pdf [hereinafter Minute 242]. A "Minute" is an agreement reached by
the Commission and submitted to both governments for approval. Szekely, supra note 323, at 398.
335. Mumme, supra note 17, at 341.
336. Minute 242, supra note 334.
337. Id.
338. See Robert Emmet Clark, InstitutionalAlternatives for Managing GroundwaterResources:
Notes for a Proposal,18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 158 (1978); Mumme, supra note 17, at 341.
339. Mumme, supra note 17, at 355.
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The environmental plan, created at the request of President George Bush and
President Salinas, consists of a series of timed stages and covers a range of
environmental topics including water.3 4' Although the agreement did not
specifically mention groundwater, it has been applied to groundwater in some
" ' The agreement has given rise to several plans and working groups
cases.34
to protect the environment along the border.342 The La Paz agreement is a
good example of what can be accomplished through cooperation.343
3. North American Free Trade Agreement Side Accord
A thorough discussion of water issues between the United States and
Mexico must include NAFTA.344 The trade increase generated by NAFTA
reduces the divisibility power of the border and increases water consumption
and potential pollution. 34 5 NAFTA is also important in a water context
because of the Environmental Side Agreement. 4 6
Until 1995, the United States and Mexico operated according to the
Integrated Environmental Border Plan (IEBP), which expressed a joint
commitment to protect and improve the environmental quality of the
borderlands. 347 After January 1995, environmental issues have been addressed
by the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord.348
The Side Accord was created in an effort to achieve sustainable
development. 349 Although the agreement is an important recognition of the
interrelated nature of trade and the environment, it does not create any new
environmental laws." It allows for enforcement "against a NAFTA membernation only if it shows a 'persistent pattern' of failure to enforce its own
environmental laws. ' 3 5' Several agencies have formed in response to NAFTA
dialogues on issues including environmental and water
to facilitate
352
concerns.

340.

Id.; Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 448.

341.

Mumme, supra note 17, at 355.

342. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 448.
343. See id.
344. See Paulette L. Stenzel, The U.S. and Mexico Sin Fronteras-Without Borders: Sustainable
Developmentfrom a Local Perspective, 27 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 441,443 (2002).
345. See id. In Piedras Negras, for example, a maquiladora for pants requires a disproportionate
quantity of water to run the ten large washing machines. Coronado, supranote 272, 14.
346. See Stenzel, supra note 344, at 443.
347. Paule, supra note 7, at 113 1.
348. Id. at 1160.
349. Stenzel, supra note 344, at 443.
350. Id.at 464.
351. Id.
352. Bennett & Herzog, supranote 272, at 98 1. These agencies include the Border XXI Framework,
the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and the North American Development Bank, and the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Id. at 981-84.
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Although this addition to NAFTA was originally considered a success by
environmentalists, further review has shown that other provisions of NAFTA
may undermine potential environmental protection."3 Articles that allow
companies to fight environmental enforcement mean that overall NAFTA is
not doing enough for the protection of the environment, including water.3 4
Future agreements can learn from NAFTA's weaknesses and must do more to
view consequences in Mexico as "our" problems as well.355
D. Looking Above the Surface: Water Law Along the Border
One of the complications for shared groundwater agreements along the
U.S.-Mexico border is the varying laws in the four United States states and six
Mexican states involved.3" 6 In the United States, a federal statute regarding
groundwater does not exist. 3 "7 "[W]ater rights, like most forms of property
rights, arise under state law., 35 Consequently, each state has different laws
of ownership and use.359 In Mexico, water is governed on a national level. 6 °
Local law must be considered when creating an international agreement
because it is the operating procedure of the state involved.36'
1. State Groundwater Law
a. Texas
Texas groundwater law is dictated by the "right of capture, 362 and is
closely tied to the notions of property ownership.363 Under this doctrine, the
person who owns the land above the water has unlimited rights to the
groundwater below. 3 4 Texas courts have upheld this right even in situations
when excess pumping by one landowner causes harm to a neighbor's land. 65

353. Stenzel, supra note 344, at 464-65.
354. Id. at 501.
355. See id.
356. Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 449 (listing the United States states of California,
Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico and the Mexican states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas).
357. Paule,supranote 7, at 1136.
358. ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WATER LAw, TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 330 (1995).
359. See Mumme, supra note 17, at 354.
360. Id.at 353-54.
361. See id.
362. TEX. WATERCODE ANN. § 36.002 (Vernon 2000); Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81
S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
363. Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 137, at 263.

364.

Id.

365.

Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1998).
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The capture doctrine has been slightly modified by the state of Texas.3 66
Under common law, pumping that occurs with malice or wanton waste is
prohibited.36 7 Additionally, in some situations, the aquifer can be defined as
an underground river, allowing it to be more regulated under a riparian rights
doctrine than it would have been as groundwater.36s
Perhaps the most significant and controversial modification of the rule
of capture was the strengthening and expansion of groundwater conservation
districts by 1997's Senate Bill 1 and Senate Bill 2 in 2001"369 These localized
districts provide for groundwater management by preventing waste,
performing research, and protecting the aquifer.37 Conservation districts can
be formed by special legislature, petitions by property owners, or by the Texas
Commission of Environmental Quality.3 7' The regulatory and oversight
powers of these districts have been interpreted as an amendment to the
absolute right to water.372
The right of capture has been widely criticized because it lacks any
regulatory authority and does little to protect a limited resource.3 73 One of the
major criticisms is the refusal of Texas courts to recognize the connection
between surface water and groundwater. 374 This allows upstream groundwater
users to affect the downstream riparian users. 3 "
b. New Mexico
In New Mexico, groundwater is considered property of the state and is
allocated to users by prior appropriation.376 Prior appropriation is a permit
system based on a person's previous and beneficial use of groundwater.377
"Typically, a groundwater appropriator is protected to a 'reasonable pumping

366. Opiela, supra note 136, at 101-05.
367. Id. at 101-04.
368. Id. at 104. Rivers, both surface and underground, are considered property of the state and use
can be regulated. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 2000).
369. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.005; Chris Lehman, Hung Out to Dry?: Groundwater
ConservationDistrictsandthe ContinuingBattle to Save Texas's Most PreciousResource, 35 TEX. TECH

L. REv. 10 1, 104-05 (2004) (describing the history and powers of groundwater conservation districts in
Texas).
370. Bruce Lesikar et al., QUESTIONS ABOUT GROUNDWATER CONVERSATION DISTRICTS INTEXAS
13(2002).

371.
372.
373.

Id. at 13-14.
See Lehman, supra note 369, at 126-27.
See Opiela, supra note 136, at 87; Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 251. See also David

S. Brookshire, et al., Western Urban WaterDemand,42 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 873,873 (2002) (speaking out

against the right of capture stating, "[t]he future viability of the arid Southwest will depend in large part
on efficient use of increasingly scarce water resources").
374. See, e.g., Denis v. Kickapoo Lank Co., 771 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
375.
376.
377.

See, e.g., id.
N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 268.
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level,' not necessarily the historical level. . . .""' The appropriation system
uses criteria such as seniority of existing users and reasonableness to issue
permits.37 9
Unlike under a right of capture doctrine, water use is a privilege and not
an absolute property right.38 ° Groundwater permits are managed and approved
by the state engineer."' Any sale of groundwater permits must also be
approved by the state.38 2 New Mexico recognizes the link between surface
and groundwater; therefore, permits are released after an examination of the
possible effects on surface water users.38 3
Although New Mexico has a strict and integrated groundwater allocation
system, the state faces future water problems.3 ' The growing population of
the state creates a continuing need for new permits.38 ' Another difficulty is the
radical difference in management philosophy held by New Mexico's neighbor,
Texas.3 6 New Mexico's control over shared water is undermined when a
neighboring state allows unlimited pumping.38 7
c. Arizona
Arizona is in the difficult position of having a highly arid climate and an
agricultural base dependant on groundwater.38 8 Excessive pumping of wells
has lowered water levels in some locations by as much as 400 feet.389 The
state uses the doctrine of reasonable use to control groundwater use. 3" This
allows a property owner to pump groundwater beneath his land only to the
extent of beneficial and reasonable use.39'
The Arizona Groundwater Management Act (GMA), passed in 1980,
divided the state into regions based on type of use and water availability.3 92
Active Management Areas (AMAs), the highest regulated category, are
restricted to previous groundwater amounts.393 Passage of the GMA created
several groundwater doctrines in one state.3" Loose restrictions in the less

378.

Id.

379.

Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 600.

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 137, at 291.
Id.
Barber, supra note 16, at 673.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.

387.

Paule, supra note 7, at 1144.

388.
389.
390.

Barber, supra note 16, at 670-7 1.
Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 137, at 274.
See Bristol v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173, 178 (Ariz. 1953).

391.

See id.
AR1z. REV. STAT. ANN.

392.
393.
394.

§§ 45-401 to 45-637 (West 2001).
Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 275-76.
Paule, supra note 7, at 1145.
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regulated areas are often in conflict with the more stringent restrictions in the
AMAs.395
d California
California uses a combination of prior appropriation and correlative
rights to regulate groundwater use.396 Under correlative rights, property
owners receive a "fair and just portion" of the groundwater and can be held
397 In shortage
liable if the withdrawal causes damage to neighboring land.
areas, the courts determine "(1) the eligible well owners (pumpers), (2) how
much water well owners can pump, and (3) the water master to monitor and
3' 9
ensure that the basin is managed in accordance with the court's decree."
The mixture of adjudicated and legal doctrines makes water protection
difficult, but the California legislature has refused to instate state-wide water
regulations. 39
2. Mexican GroundwaterLaw
Spanish law was similar to English common law stating that the owner
of the overlying land was entitled to right of capture but added that
4
groundwater underlying public lands constitutes public groundwater. "' After
independence from Spain, Mexico retained the distinction between private and
public waters.40 '
02
Groundwater policy was originally defined in the 1917 Constitution.
Article 27 states that "[u]nderground waters may be brought to the surface by
artificial works and utilized by the surface owner, but if the public interest so
requires or use by others is affected, the Federal Executive may regulate its
40 3
extraction and utilization, and even establish prohibited areas.
Groundwater use is regulated by the government based on the order of
priorities for the water source.
Mexico has subsequently passed legislation to facilitate the governmental
protection and control of groundwater use.40 5 In 1934, Mexico passed the

395.

Id.

396. Barber, supra note 16, at 669-70.
397. Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 137, at 279 (quoting Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
76 P.2d 681, 686-87 (Cal. 1938).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 281.
400. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 57, at 222-23.
401. Teclaff, supra note 134, at 62.
402. See MFX. CONST. art. 27 15 (amended 1983), available at http://www.ilstu.educlasshist263/
docs/1917const.html#Article27 (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
403. Id.
404. Barber, supra note 16, at 663.
405. Id.
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National Water Law (Ley de Aguas Nacionales), which lays out the legal
framework for all water usage and revised all water policy in Mexico.4 6 The
Law of Conservation and Groundwater of 1956 (Le Ley de Conservaciondel
Suelo y Aguas) "established a system of restricted zones and a permit system
to regulate the development of groundwaters. '4 7 More recently, Mexico
created a National Water Commission (Comision Nacionalde Agua) in part
40 8
to regulate water use.
It is certainly understandable that conflict might arise when Mexican
national policy is forced to merge with four different state policies. 4 The
federalization of Mexico's groundwater and subsequent legislation reflect the
country's views on the importance of water.410 International negotiations must
consider the cultural attitude of a state towards a resource to create a
successful agreement.4 '
IV. ANALYZING POLICY OPTIONS AND CREATING A ROADMAP TO AN
AGREEMENT

The most important step in the creation of an international groundwater
agreement is realizing one is necessary.4" A more effective result is achieved
by proactive planning rather than in the wake of an emergency.4" 3 In the realm
of water, a reactionary decision often limits the possibilities.4 14 The options
for a water agreement along the United States-Mexico border are more
numerous now than they will be once resources have been further depleted or
contaminated. 4 " The time to act is now."" Plans need to be developed
between the two countries to understand common resources and how they can
be used and protected in the future.4"

406. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272, at 981.
407. Stephen P. Mumme, The US. Conflict Over TransboundaryGroundwaters:Some Institutional
and PoliticalConsiderations, 12 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 505, 518 (1980).
408. Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272, at 981.
409. See Dworsky & Utton, supra note 134, at 449.
410. Barber, supra note 16, at 664-65.
411. See id.
412. See Minute 242, supra note 334,
5-6.
413. See e.g., Arias, supra note 80, at 199 (proposing conservation efforts before more
environmental damage occurs).
414. See, e.g., id. (terminating groundwater pumping did not repair the irreversible damage to the
river and surrounding vegetation).
415. See FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 329. Depending on local geology, the combination
of long residence times for groundwater and recovery time needed after
pumping, it is conceivable that a
water source could be depleted faster than it can recharge. See id.
416. See Chavez, supra note I, at 237-38, 250-51 (explaining that the current water situation in El
Paso will not sustain the city into the future).
417. See Mumme, supra note 17, at 361.
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Once it has been decided to create an accord, the parties must choose the
basis of the policy. 418 One of the exciting and daunting aspects of groundwater
19
policy is that it is virtually uncharted territory. This being said, other
40 These include oil and gas law,
sources of law can be used as models.
environmental law, and state law.4" Although these can serve as a useful
beginning, the differences and unique circumstances groundwater presents
422
need to be recognized and included in the process.
In addition to existing law, several factors should be considered in the
drafting of any groundwater agreement. 4 3 These criteria are the result of
academic and international organizations, as well as trial and error from past
accords.42 4 A critical examination of the options with local issues can help
42
achieve a working arrangement specifically designed for a certain area. '
A. InternationalShared Oil & Gas Law
Oil and gas resources often cross international boundaries creating the
need for a use agreement.42 6 Many examples exist of accords established to
427
develop the common resource in the interim of the boundary dispute.
Although groundwater can be distinguished from petroleum by its lifethe issues faced in international resource law are
sustaining function, many of
428
policy.
applicable to water
42 9'
Similar to oil and gas, access to water is linked to property rights. A
430 But even for
country has a right to use what lies beneath its territory.
hydrocarbon deposits, international law governs that one state must not take
unilateral action if it "risks depriving other states of the gains they might
realize. 4 31 One state must notify the other state of any intent to harvest a

418. See, e.g., Rodgers& Utton, supra note 32, at 165-210; Hayton & Utton, supra note 242, at 663
(providing examples of sample treaties and agreement options for governments).
419. Rodgers & Utton, supra note 32, at 151.
420. See Ernst Willheim, Australia-Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a
Joint Development Zone in the "Timor Gap," 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821 (1989).
421. See, e.g., id.; Paule, supra note 7, at 1156-58; Teclaff& Teclaff, supra note 32, at 642-47
(listing water treaties based on and including environmental provisions).
422. See BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 104.
423. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202.
424. See id.; Watercourse Convention, supra note 198, at art. 6(1).
425. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202.
426. See, e.g., Willheim, supra note 420, at 821.
427. See id.at 832-34 (listing joint development agreements between Thailand and Malaysia, the
Republic of Korea and Japan, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).
428. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 104.
429. REx. J. ZEDALIS, INTERNATiONAL ENERGY LAw 72 (2000).
430. Id.
431. David M. Ong, JointDevelopment of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: "Mere"State
Practice or Customary InternationalLaw?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 771, 798 (1999).
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shared resource.4 32 These theories also apply to water because one country
433
cannot deprive another of sustainability.
Development is usually limited to the extent that it harms the sharing
party.434 Harm is defined as one country taking more than its share.435 Most
joint development arrangements create an authority to facilitate the
agreement.4 36 Many of these agreements also present useful alternatives for
approaching differing national laws and customs, profit sharing, and dispute
resolution to realize a common goal. 37
A distinction needs to be made between joint development and joint
use.4 38 Development is used in the petroleum context because the resource is
accessed until ultimately emptied. 39 In contrast, negotiations regarding water
are usually initiated to determine its use over time. 4 Unlike oil and gas
reserves, most aquifers are renewable and are difficult to delineate, making the
terms of a use agreement different. 44' Although differences between water and
other resources bar the direct application of oil and gas agreements to water,
442
their similar roots in property law create a useful starting point for policy.
B. InternationalEnvironmentalLaw
International environmental law is another possible source of future
groundwater policy. 443 This twentieth century emerging doctrine was created
in response to environmental degradation.444 Issues such as political
sovereignty and culture create a beneficial tool for international treaties in

432. Id. at 802.
433. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for ManagingInternationally-Shared
Water Resources: RestrictedSovereignty vs. Community of Property,26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 3031(1994).
434. ZEDALIS, supra note 429, at 72.
435. Id. at 73.
436. Willheim, supra note 420, at 832-33.
437. Id. at 836-39.
438. Compareid.at 831-39 (showing an example ofjoint development), with Wohlwend, supranote
61, at I (showing an example ofjoint use).
439. See, e.g., Willheim, supra note 420, at 821.
440. See, e.g., Wohlwend, supra note 61, at I.
441. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 27. Some fossil aquifers are not renewable creating a larger
problem when unmonitored mining occurs. See id. Although most aquifers are considered renewable, the
residence time required to recharge many aquifers is so high that a city would be forced to find an alternate
water source. See TODD, supra note 21, at 24-25.
442. See Willheim, supra note 420, at 831-39.
443. See Teclaff& Teclaff, supra note 32, at 629; ALEXANDRE CHARLES Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS ININTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29-40 (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law
Paper, No. 10, 1976).
444. LoRi F. DAM ROSCH ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1509 (4th ed. 2001)
(1980).
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other arenas." 5 Additionally, the United Nations recommendation to apply
other international law in the absence of a water agreement makes familiarity
valuable.446
Fear of groundwater pollution motivates accord creation to protect
transboundary water sources. 447 Past treaties focus on maintaining water
448
quality of surface water and protecting flow quantity. Many interconnected
449 More recent
aquifers have been indirectly protected by these regulations.
4
treaties contain specific provisions to protect groundwater. "' Once the
and groundwater was recognized, the focus of
interrelated nature of surface
45'
shift.
to
treaties began
Current agreements often regulate surface water quality to the detriment
4 52 Surface water quality regulations often increase the
groundwater.
of
probability of waste being placed on the ground, which can percolate down
4 3 A few modem agreements were
and contaminate groundwater sources.
44
specifically created to protect groundwater. These can be helpful to wateruse accords by setting a framework and opening a dialog between two states
regarding shared resources. 455 Future water allocation policy needs to mention
groundwater specifically and encompass an entire aquifer system to be
effective.456
As seen in oil and gas joint development agreements, environmental
457 Duties of the
agreements often create commissions for management.
458
Policy
commission vary depending on the terms of the treaty.
responsibility,
characteristics such as the concepts of international
45 9
cooperation, and enforcement are also useful to water policy authors. For
example, international law principles, such as the idea that one nation should

445. See Albert E. Utton, InternationalWater Quality Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 157 (Ludwik A. Teclaff& Albert E. Utton eds., 1974).
446. Caponera & Alheritiere, supranote 18, at 613-14 (citing Report of the UnitedNations Water
Conference, Mar del Plata Conference, at 51, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.70/CBP/1 (1977)).
447. Teclaff& Teclaff, supra note 32, at 636-39.
448. Id. at 636-37.
449. Id. at 637.
450. Id. at 638.
451. Id. at 639.
452. Id. at 641.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 642-47.
455. See id.
456. See Utton, supra note 445, at 154-55.
457. Teclaff& Teclaff, supranote 32, at 647; see Utton, supra note 445, at 174-77 (explaining that
the use of commissions to plan and maintain the drainage basin is the best way to deal with state
sovereignty issues).
458. Teclaff& Teclaff, supra note 32, at 647-51.
459. Kiss, supra note 443, at 29, 41-55; Lynton K. Caldwell, Concepts in Development of
InternationalEnvironmentalPolicies, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12, 12-13 (Ludwik A.
Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1974) ("[N]ations should cooperate to serve the mutual interests of their
respective peoples.").
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not harm another, have been applied in the environmental context and should
be used in water policy.46
The key difference between water and environmental law is water law's
roots in property law.46' A direct application of environmental law would
require a change of perspective.462 Water needs to be viewed as more than an
economic resource.463 This is an appropriate change in thinking for a number
of reasons.464 First, water's life-sustaining function sets it apart from a mere
economic commodity.4 65 Second, although water is often treated as a property
466
right, water does not fit well into a property construct.
The following factors are required for the assignment of property rights
to a watercourse: First, the resource must be able to be divided both
physically and economically. Second, distribution must be accepted by all
riparians and protected from non-owners. Finally, transaction costs of water
rights should be low to make trade profitable. 467 The physical characteristics
of water make it impossible for it to adhere to these guidelines.468 Redefining
water as a resource would make it easier to legally address. 469
C. State Law
Existing surface and groundwater law along the United States-Mexico
border may be a natural choice for international agreements, but many
problems can arise.
One of the problems with applying state law to an
international agreement is deciding whose law prevails when two or three
different legal structures are involved. 47' This is a critical decision because
some groundwater law is more stringent than others and can have serious
effects on the outcome.47 2
Lack ofexisting regulation along the Mexico border means water belongs
to whoever can access it first.4 " Choosing Texas's right of capture for an
agreement would not change the current situation along the border. 474 This

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

Caldwell, supra note 459, at 12.
Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 251.
See id.
See Caldwell, supra note 459, at 16.
See BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 104.
Id.
See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 395-96.
Id.
See id. at 396.
See id. at 395-98.
See Paule, supra note 7, at 1136-50.
See id.
See Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 274-8 i, 290-92.
See Chavez, supra note I, at 250-51.
See Opiela, supra note 136, at 88-89; Chavez, supra note 1, at 250-51.
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system of allocation has proven ineffectual based on current water
476
shortages.47 Therefore, direct application of Texas law should be avoided.
Other state law options such as prior appropriation would also be
difficult to apply.477 The permitting system used by prior appropriation states
is in large part based on past water use. 478 Although permitting is a viable
solution, insufficient records by any state bar the ability to assign permits
based on prior usage.4 79 Governmental ownership systems such as Mexico's
are also not applicable across borders.480 Water flowing beneath two states
cannot be owned and utilized by only one.48 '
State practices such as correlative rights and reasonable use do have
application value outside their state of origin.482 Under both of these
doctrines, a party's water allocation depends on the amount used for a
beneficial purpose.48 " The reasonable use doctrine was created when
4
Conflicts
circumstances forced the modification of the rule of capture.
against
uses
and
rates
between users are resolved by "comparing pumping
"
4
reasonableness criteria." In order to prevent waste, reasonableness is
determined by several factors, including well location, water quantity, and
486 Under correlative rights, pumping is only limited if a shortage
water 4use.
87
exists.
Although a direct application of one state's law over another's may not
be feasible, the ideas of reasonable use and alternatives to an absolute right to
488
water should be incorporated into any international agreement. Prior use
can be considered, but an absolute right within a state cannot be guaranteed
to carry across a border.48 9 Consideration of a state's current laws is also
critical for a cooperative effort.49

475. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 250-51.
476. See Opiela, supra note 136, at 88-89.
477. See Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 268.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See MEX.CONST. art. 27 15 (amended 1983), available at http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/
docs/1917const.html#Article27 (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
481. See Paule, supra note 7,at 1130.
482. See Kaiser & Skillem, supra note 137, at 264-67.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 264.
485. Id. at 265.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 267.
488. See id. at 264-67.
489. See id.at 267.
490. See Bennett & Herzog, supra note 272, at 978-79.
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D. Factors
The purpose of an international agreement should be to successfully use
" ' To
and protect a shared resource in a manner that is fair and sustainable.49
49
2
accomplish this, certain factors should be considered.
These range from
factual information such as scientific scenarios and economic impacts to less
tangible issues including negotiation principles and reasonableness. 493 Lists
of factors to obtain reasonable and equitable use were created by the Helsinki
Rules and the ILC.494 These have been expanded and modified by scholars
and proposed agreements.4 95 Although some of the concepts are generally
applicable, others have particular significance alongthe United States-Mexico
border.496
1. Approaching the Agreement
One of the most important factors that can determine the success of an
agreement cannot be found in the words.4 97 A large part of water issues are
political; therefore, the nontangible goals and attitudes of the parties and the
manner they approach the negotiations are vital parts of the process.4
Because of the complexities of international law and the complications
geology can add to the situation, parties should use an interdisciplinary
approach to any negotiation.49 International law needs to be flexible enough
to deal with different situations surrounding shared groundwater but specific
enough to demand the cooperation necessary.5"
Water is needed by everyone; consequently, governments need to focus
on sustainable development of the affected society as a whole.5"' "States...
can no longer define their self-interests solely in terms of political
boundaries."50 2 Part of this process is ceasing to view water as an economic

491. See Hayton & Utton, supra note 242, at 682 ("The Parties recognize their common interest and
responsibility in ensuring the reasonable and equitable development and management ofgroundwaters
in the border region for the well being of their Peoples.") (alteration in original).
492. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202.
493. See id.; Watercourse Convention, supra note 198, at art. 6(1).
494. See supra text accompanying notes 210, 223; Helsinki Rules, supra note 202; Watercourse
Convention, supra note 199, at art. 6(l).
495. See, e.g., Hayton & Utton, supra note 242, at 664.
496. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 1-5.
497. See Utton,supra note 28, at 112-14.
498. See Bennett& Herzog, supra note 272, at 987-88. "Indeed, states' control over national natural
resources has been a major factor for both unsustainability and human maltreatment. As demands for these
resources increased, so did the governments' inclination to use them as a domestic political tool."
BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at 14-15.

499.
500.
501.
502.

See Hayton & Utton, supra note 242, at 664.
Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 18, at 591.
See Stenzel, supra note 344, at 441.
McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 139.
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resource.5" Considering water as only an economic commodity minimizes its
necessity to users.'" Unlike oil and gas, the need for shared water extends
across the border.0 5 Future laws should focus on use and control of water, not
ownership." 6
In the alternative, if water is considered a commodity, the need to
negotiate a use agreement remains.0 7 The U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision that water is an article of commerce has applicability in an
international context.' Although the U.S. Constitution cannot be legally
enforced outside the country, the philosophy behind the decision can be
incorporated into negotiations."0 9 According to the Commerce Clause,
geographic prohibitions of an article affecting commerce within the United
States are generally unconstitutional." 0 Members of neighboring states have
rights to those products and their flow across borders should not be
inhibited."'
The border's purpose as a barrier between the United States and Mexico
has become increasingly ineffectual as a joint economy evolves." 2 The
NAFTA opened borders for products as well as a work force, moving away
from a state-centric approach towards a market economy." 3 If water is
considered a product of commerce, it would follow that NAFTA's freedom of
motion principles would extend to it." 4 Whether water is considered an
economic resource or a basic human right, the collective-action problem
requires cooperation among parties for allocation."'
Unfortunately, cooperation in past agreements has been used to widen the
power gap, not maximize the resource." 6 Because water is needed for
survival, agreements should attempt to satisfy all participants' long-term
needs." 7 "Cooperation in the utilization of water resources should be
recognized as a long-term effort based on collective action for an indefinite
'5 Although
time period, rather than as a discrete transaction ....

503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

518.

See BENVENIST1, supra note 42, at 104.
See id.
See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 139.
Utton, supra note 28, at 113.
See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 94!, 947-54 (1982).
See id. at 984-60.
See id.
3.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
See id.
See Stenzel, supra note 344, at 443.
See id. at 451-52.
See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 941.
Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 388-89.
BENvENISTI, supra note 42, at 43-44.
See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 399.
Id. at 399-400.
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cooperation is not required by international law, practice has shown its
benefits." 9
A useful starting point for cooperation is the international law principle
to avoid causing harm to another state.52 In the context of water, this could
occur by exploitation or pollution of a shared resource.52 ' The principle of
"avoiding harm" has been echoed by many international treaties and is clearly
522
enunciated in many UN resolutions, ILA rules, and ILC recommendations.
This goal can be satisfied by open communication between the nations and
notification of withdrawals.523 Notice of water removal by one state allows
to object if harm will be caused, causing the water to be used
the other state
5 24
equitably.
2. Equitable Utilization
Equitable utilization is based on two states individually developing a
shared resource on their respective side of the border without causing
appreciable harm to the other. 25 At present, water allocations along the
United States border are far from equitable. 26 Many Mexican colonias can
barely meet their water needs, while United States residents have an abundant
supply. 27 To achieve long-term sustainability, efforts must be made to create
a better balance between use and need. 28
The reasonable and equitable use model is evidenced in most
international resource treaties and is the cornerstone of most groundwater law
recommendations. 29 Equitable utilization is the sole purpose of the Helsinki
Rules' factors. 3 ' The flexibility intrinsic in this doctrine contributes to its
effectiveness. 3' Extremes such as territorial sovereignty and absolute liability
yield to a standard of reasonableness. 32 Although some critics believe the
undefined concept is too vague, with proper institutional enforcement, the

519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 412-13.
See Barberis,supra note 26, at 169.
See id. at 169-70.
See id. at 170-71.
See id. at 177-79.
See id.
See id. at 175.
Coronado, supra note 271, 13.
Id.
See id.
See Helsinki Rules, supranote 202, at art. IV; Watercourse Convention, supra note 199, at art.

6(1).
530. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. IV ("Each basin State is entitled, within its territory,
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses ofthe waters of an international drainage basin.").
531. See Utton, supra note 445, at 168-69.
532.
532. Id.
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balance between structure and elasticity is necessary for a working
agreement. 3 3
Equitable does not necessarily mean equal. 34 One solution would be to
allow a state access only to the quantity of water directly beneath it, but this
may not be the best solution depending on other surrounding circumstances.5 35
Consideration of many factors seeks to create a balance between the states. 36
The total benefits and detriments to a state are weighed to determine
allocation quantities.5 37 Utilization is based on the individual needs of an
area. 538 This flexible and individual treatment of basins creates a framework
to build a workable agreement.539
3. Surface Water/GroundwaterRelationship
A groundwater agreement would be incomplete without considering the
relationship between surface water and groundwater.54 Consideration of the
entire drainage basin was the landmark recommendation of the Helsinki
Rules. 4 ' Although initially resisted by the ILC, the basin concept was
ultimately incorporated into its recommendations as well, further confirming
its importance.5 42
Evaluation of surface water in conjunction with groundwater is necessary
because of geologic principles. 43 Water in any form is part of an interrelated
cycle, and the quantity of water on the planet is unchanging.5 44 In addition to
the hydrologic cycle relationship, water bodies are often directly related to one
another hydrologically. 4 Many rivers obtain their base flow from aquifers,
and the reverse can also occur.5 46 An agreement that focuses on the allocation
5 47
of only one water type might inadvertently damage an adjacent water body.
Consideration of the entire basin would also protect areas where a water
source is located on one side of the border but the primary source for recharge
is found on the other. 48 In this scenario, the latter state could cause

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

Id. at 170-71.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. IV.
See Barberis, supra note 26, at 177-78.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202, at art. IV.
See Barberis, supra note 25, at 177.
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 37 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1991; 2002 Cum. Supp.)
See Utton, supra note 445, at 168-69.
See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 139-40; Utton, supra note 28, at 112-13.
See Helsinki Rules, supra note 202.
See Thirty-Second Session, supranote 219, Supp. No. 10, at 247.
See Eckstein & Eckstein, supranote 57, at 235-48.
TODD, supra note 21, at 42; FREEzE & CHERRY, supranote 19, at 3-4.
See id. at 222-27.
See id. at 225-27.
See Eckstein & Eckstein, supranote 57, at 222-27.
See id.
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appreciable harm to the former's water source without pumping a drop.549 The
expanse of geologic possibilities requires politicians to consider the science
of an area to create the most functional agreement for a particular region.550
4. Regional Agreements
The United States and Mexico could develop an agreement that applies
to all shared groundwater along the border, but the scope of an agreement can
" ' Geologic differences and varying needs could
determine its effectiveness.55
make a border-wide agreement difficult and ultimately unsuccessful.55 2
Global agreements for surface water are somewhat more functional because
553
of the linear structure of a river with clear upstream and downstream users.
Contrarily, aquifers are generally localized despite possible hydrologic
connections to surface water.554 Aquifers affect a restricted community with
individual concerns. 55 These issues must be considered in an agreement,
which is difficult to accomplish in a large scale accord.556
The Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer agreement exemplifies the
advantages of a regional approach.557 Two governments created a use policy
and an enforcement commission that could be regulated on a local level to
solve a common problem. 55 ' The agreement focuses on equitable utilization
and resists the notion of territorial sovereignty to fulfill the needs of the area
for more than twenty-five years. 59 The accord's success has been partially
attributed to its tailor-made, area-specific details. 60
The value of a tailor-made agreement founded on regional needs can be
seen by comparing the Upper San Pedro River Basin and the El Paso/Ciudad
Juarez case.56 Both of these areas have concerns regarding shared aquifers
that cross the United States-Mexico border.56 2 Although their concern is

549.
550.
551.
552.

See id.
See id. at 235-48.
Hayton, supra note 191, at 71.
See supra Part ILA; Utton, supra note 445, at 169-70 ("Each drainage basin is a unique entity

553. See, e.g., Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, and Supplementary Protocol, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219.
554. See FREEZE & CHERRY, supra note 19, at 48.
555. See, e.g., Arias, supra note 80, at 199.
556. See Coronado, supra note 271, 23 ("Sister cities could elaborate an equitable plan to share
water resources, always keeping in mind the needs of other communities and water users in the region.").
557. See Wohlwend, supra note 61, at 1.
558. Id. at 2-3.
559. See id. at 10-l i.
560. See id. at 6.
561. See Arias, supra note 80, at 199; Chavez, supra note 1, at 237.
562. Arias, supra note 80, at 203-05; Chavez, supra note 1, at 239-40.
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facially similar, the issues challenging each region are considerably different,
creating the need for diverse solutions. 63
The Upper San Pedro River Basin has a sufficient water supply, but
environmental concerns regarding excessive pumping lowering the water table
have arisen. " A lower water table has significant ecologic effects on
migratory birds.565 Part of the problem is the geologic relationship between
the San Pedro River and two interconnected aquifers. 66 Public hearings
between the two countries led to an agreement regarding the value of the river
basin and proposed site-specific solutions to prevent further harm.567 An
effective agreement needs to consider geology and the specific regional
problems.568
In contrast, water issues in El Paso and Ciudad Juarez exclusively spring
from insufficient water quantity aggravated by rapidly increasing population
on both sides of the border.5 69 The shared Hueco Bolson aquifer is more
hydrologically isolated than the San Pedro Basin aquifers.570 Although some
interrelatedness has been found between the aquifer and the Rio Grande River,
current concerns have not resulted from this relationship but rather from overexploitation of the aquifer.57 ' Negotiations between the two cities focused on
water allocation and alternative water sources.572
The substantial differences between these geographically proximate
aquifers reinforce the notion that regional agreements are the most effective
approach to international water agreements.573 Regional agreements are also
"conducive to recognition of similar needs and methods in the relations
between and among States. 574
A regional approach can have weaknesses.5 75 Perhaps the largest ofthese
is enforcement.5 76 Is there a method to enforce an agreement between two
municipalities? Processes must be put into place to preserve the agreement's
7
integrity and sustainability, or its objective can be easily undermined.

563. See Arias, supra note 80, at 212-17; Chavez, supra note 1, at 237.
564. Arias, supra note 80, at 199.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 203-05.
567. Id. at 212-17.
568. See id. at 213-17.
569. Chavez, supra note 1, at 237.
570. See J.C. Day, InternationalAquiferManagement:The Hueco Bolson on the Rio Grande River,
18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 164-70 (1978).
571. Chavez, supra note 1, at 237; see Walton & Ohimacher, supra note 11, at 3.
572. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 246-50.
573. Compare Arias, supra note 80, at 199 (describing the regional and geologic characteristics of
the San Pedro Aquifer), with Chavez, supra note 1, at 237 (describing the regional and geologic
characteristics of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer).
574. Hayton, supra note 191, at 92.
575. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 444, at 22-23.
576. See id.
577. See id.
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5. Enforcement
The United States Constitution provides little guidance regarding treaty
formation and enforcement.5 78 The President "shall have the Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
' The Cases and Controversies Clause
thirds of the Senators present concur."579
extends judicial power to treaties, but although the Supremacy Clause further
limits treaties, it does not define them.5"' The Compacts Clause prohibits
states from creating treaties with other nations but does allow compacts or
agreements to be made with the consent of Congress. 8 '
At the international level, many questions arise regarding enforcement
of treaties. 2 One of the most useful and common types of enforcement is
voluntary compliance.5 83 Sanctions, both forcible and nonforcible, detailed
within the treaty and the possible remedies within national courts also
encourage conformity. 5 The creation of a local regulatory commission is a
popular and effective tool for enforcement, especially in regional
agreements. 5
Regional organizations encourage participation for an agreement on a
local level.5 8 6 Joint creation eases the transition from state sovereignty to
cooperative interactions.58 7 Commissions can be locally created with area588
specific duties or federally created and responsible for a larger region.
Agencies can serve as technical advisors for local hydrogeology, monitor
groundwater withdrawals, and perform dispute resolution. 5 9 The national
power creating the commission determines the extent of its authority.590
Along the United States-Mexico border, the IBWC is a natural choice to
" ' The IBWC's long history of enforcement and
regulate future agreements.59

578. See U.S. CONST.
579. Id. at art. 11,§ 2.
580. Id. at art. 111,§ 2, art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
581. Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
582. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 444, at 22.
583. Id. at 23.
584. Id.
585. See Caponera, supra note 218, at 17-25 (listing international river commissions created
worldwide).
586. See Wohlwend, supra note 61, at 6. One of the remarkable aspects of the Franco-Swiss
Agreement is that it was created and is regulated on a regional level. Id.at 3.
587. See Utton, supra note 445, at 174-75.
588. Compare Wohlwend, supra note 61, at 6 (providing an example of regional organization in the
case of the Franco-Swiss agreement), with Mumme & Moore, supra note 315, at 661-63 (describing the
IBWC, a federal regulatory agency).
589. See Hamner & Wolf, supra note 38, at 166.
590. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 314, at 663, 666.
591. See id. at 661-63.
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broad range of powers could facilitate both nationwide as well as federally
approved regional agreements. 9 2 The unusual autonomy of the IBWC
ameliorates the Constitutional prohibition on local international agreements.593
Agency approval of proposed arrangements would probably not preclude the
need for congressional approval, but it could hasten the process. 94
An additional enforcement advantage along the Mexico border is the
consejos de cuencas.595 These binational watershed councils are familiar with
regional water issues and local politics. 5" Their personal connections with the
people affected would assist in cooperative practice.597 The consejos de
cuencas together with the IBWC create a powerful framework for the
enforcement of groundwater agreements on the United States-Mexico
border. 98 Threats of severe water shortages, seventeen shared transboundary
aquifers, and the necessity of water, coupled with existing institutional
support, overwhelm any grounds to delay action."
V. CONCLUSION
In many regions of the world, water is running out.60 0 As communities
search for alternative drinking water sources, increasing numbers are turning
to groundwater to meet their growing needs.60 ' As dependence on
groundwater escalates, so do the opportunities for conflict.0 2 This is
especially true in situations where more than one state can claim ownership
of the resource." 3
The United States and Mexico share several aquifers underneath their
common border.' Although treaties are in place between the two countries
to allocate surface water, no policy exists to distribute shared subsurface water
resources." 5 To achieve long term sustainability, agreements must be
promptly created to equitably allocate water among parties. 6

592. See Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram, States, Markets and Beyond: Governance of
TransboundaryWater Resources, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439,444-45 (2000).
593. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 314, at 667, 669.
594. See id.
595. See discussion supra Part IIl.B; Brown & Mumme, supra note 321, at 895.
596. See Brown & Mumme, supra note 321, at 895.

597.

See id.

598. Seeid. at910-11.
599. Mumme, supra note 17, at 363-77; Chavez, supranote 1, at 237-39; Mumme & Moore, supra
note 314, at 661.
1-2.
600. See, e.g., Coronado, supranote 271,
601. See Sampat, supra note 27, at 10-13.
602. See id.
603. See, e.g., Mumme, supra note 17, at 363-77.
604. See id.
605. See Chavez, supra note 1, at 237-39; Szekely, supra note 323, at 397.
606. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note I, at 237.
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Groundwater agreements can derive successful methods from other types
of law and scholarly disciplines, but its unique characteristics require
agreements be customized for regional issues including geology, custom, and
needs.60 7 Other factors, including cooperation and the relationship between
surface water and groundwater, need to be included in all future accords.6 '
The invisibility of aquifers makes its disappearance difficult to imagine,
but the threat is real.60 9 "'The challenge ahead is for us to transcend the selfinterests of our respective nation-states so as to embrace a broader self-interest
-the survival of the human species in a threatened world.' ",6'
by Amy Hardberger

607. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C.
608. See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 388-89; Utton, supra note 445, at 168-69.
609. Rodgers & Utton, supra note 32, at 152.
610. World Commission on Environment and Development: Public Hearing, Ottawa, Canada
(1986) (statement ofT. McMillan, Minister of Environment, Government of Canada), reprinted in WCED,
Our Common Future 263 (1987).

